Search results for "environmental agreement"
showing 6 items of 6 documents
Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach
2012
This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that utilizes dynamic state-space games to analyze the formation of international agreements to control pollution. The survey considers both the cooperative approach and the noncooperative approach. In the case of the latter, the survey distinguishes between the models that assume binding agreements and those that assume the contrary. An evaluation of the state of the art is presented in the conclusions along w…
L'accordo in materia di ambiente
2008
Il concetto di «accordo ambientale» copre una vasta area fenomenica di non facile definizione e classificazione che va dall’impegno unilaterale non giuridicamente vincolante preso da un dato settore industriale al fine di realizzare un certo obiettivo di protezione dell’ambiente, ad un vero e proprio contratto tra l’industria e l’autorità pubblica (nazionale o locale) per negoziare e fissare obiettivi di rilievo ambientale e/o modalità per la loro implementazione. L’indagine monografica sull’istituto, svolta con metodo comparitisitico e centrata sulle esperienze europee, è tesa ad illustrare tanto gli aspetti caratterizzanti l’istituto che si articolano in una area di forte ibridità tra dir…
An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?
2022
AbstractThis paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose emissions. Three types of agreements are studied, a mitigation agreement for which countries coordinate their decisions only on emissions; an adaptation agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation and a complete agreement when there is coordination in both emissions and adaptation levels. In every case, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental proble…
Economic analysis of the international cooperation to face global environmental problems
2013
Because of the doubts about the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, several scholars have asked whether other types of agreements can be designed to achieve large reductions of GHG emissions. Designing a profitable and stable international environmental agreement (IEA) that deals with the shortcomings of Kyoto-type agreement is the main motivation of this work. One idea would be to focus on technology improvements in order to reduce abatement costs, as this might increase a country's willingness to undertake significant emission reductions. For example, it could be beneficial to supplement a Kyoto-type agreement with technology elements if technological development depends not only on a co…
Characteristics of environmental treaties (remarks on the background of polish law)
2018
The subject of the study is an indication of the characteristics of international agreements in the field of environmental protection. The analysis of environmental international agreements allows for the formulation of several characteristics, generally assuming that these contracts are not different from other international agreements in the national legal order and are subject to thesame legal regime at international level. Characteristics include: institutionalization of treaties, specific design, susceptibility to change due to scientific progress, sectorality and subject and formal diversity. The author is aware that studying the basics of environmental protection can lead to the sepa…
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited
2004
In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values…